SUMMARY OF AUGUST 1996 REVIEW BOARD ACTIONS ON SECURITY CLASSIFIED HSCA TESTIMONY OF JOHN SCELSO
(180-10131-10330)

page; line	Board Action	Modification detail	date/sub.lang.
19; 9, 11, 22	P		Review 05/1997, "CIA Employee."
52; 5-6	M	Protect first four words of line 5; release rest of line.	10/2017, "Operational Details."
52; 11	R (see release on p.141)		
52; 21 & 23	R & R		
53; 6	R		
55; 25	P		10/2017 "Describes technical operation."
56; 4-7	M	Release line 4; protect all of line 5; release lines 6 & 7	10/2017, "Describes intelligence operation in Mexico City."
56; 19-23	M	postpone from 4th word in line 19 through the third word in line 21; release rest of lines 21- 23	10/2017, "Describes intelligence operation in Mexico City."
56; 25	P		10/2017 "Describes technical operation."
57: 2	P		10/2017 "Describes individuals."
57; 4-7	P		10/2017 "Describes technical operation."

page; line	Board Action	Modification detail	date/sub lang
57; 10-11	M	Release line 10, postpone 1st, 2nd, and 4th - 6th words on line 11.	10/2017, "Describes intelligence operations " "Describes a group of people."
57; 14	R		
57; 17-19	P		10/2017 "Describes technical operation."
57; 20-23	M	protect last three words on line 20; release lines 21-23.	10/2017, "Describes intelligence operation"
57; 24	P		10/2017, "Describes intelligence operation"
58; 2-3	P		Release 2017, "Describes intelligence operation."
64; 18-21 & 22	R		
68; 13	P		Scelso language and identifier.
83; 14-15	P		10/2017 "Describes individual."
83; 18	P		Release date 08/2006; "Crypt."
83; 22-23	P		10/2017 "Describes meeting."
83; 25	P		Release 2017, "No suitable substitute language"
84; 1-2	P		Release 2017, "No suitable substitute language"

page; line	Board Action	Modification detail	date/sub lang
84; 7-11	P		Release 2017, "No suitable substitute language"
84; 13-14	R		
84; 17	P		10/2017 "No suitable substitute language."
84; 19	P		10/2017 "Describes technical operation."
85; 10 85; 19	P P		Release date 08/2006. "crypt" "crypt"
86; 12	P		Release date 08/2006. "crypt"
86; 15	P		10/2017. "describes personnel
87; 8 9	P		Scelso language and date.
91; 6-7 8-9 9	P		Release date 08/2006. "description."
106; 11	P		Release date 08/2006. "crypt"
140; 20	R		
140; 23	P		Release date 08/2006, "Operational Detail"
141; 5-6	R		
141; 9	P		Release 2017, "CIA Installation in Western Hemisphere 17"
168; 24	R		
171; 19	R		

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page; line	Board Action	Modification detail	date/sub.lang.
181; 13	P		Scelso date. Sub.lang. "location".
185; 10-11	R		
185; 20	R		
185; 22-24	R		
notes/ index: p. 1	P		Review 05/1997 "CIA Employee."

CIA team disk 8\ scel_act.wpd

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27 September 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director
Assassination Records Review Board

FROM: John F. Pereira
Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: Reconsideration of Releases in Scelso Testimony and Lopez Report

(We request that this memorandum be returned to CIA once the Board has completed its deliberations on the issues discussed below.)

1. (S) Issue. This memo is to request that the JFK Board reconsider its decision to release certain information contained in the HSCA testimony of John Scelso and in the Lopez Report. Specifically CIA requests that the phrases "political action program" (pg. 64 Scelso Testimony, pg. 177, 178 Lopez Report); "Mexican police" (pg. 85 Scelso Testimony); and "is exposed by Agee in his book" (pg. 141 Scelso Testimony) be postponed from release. We also offer some suggestions for substitute language which we believe will not detract from the JFK assassination story, yet still protect the information at issue.

I. Mexican Political Action Program

"We were running, at that time, a vast ***political action*** program in Mexico City ***to try to swing Mexico around from its Leftist direction to a middle of the road direction and it succeeded.*** I don't know whether you informed yourself about the magnitude of our ***political action*** program there at the time -- absolutely enormous"
(Scelso, 64; Lopez, pp. 177, 178)

2. (S) From the early 1950's to the mid-1960's, Mexico City Station conducted a political action campaign to minimize leftist influence on and within the Mexican Government. The campaign utilized student groups, a front group of progressive businessmen, and Catholic lay group writers and operatives in political action and media placement efforts. The Station currently does not have a political action program designed to influence Mexican

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SUBJECT: Reconsideration of Releases in Scelso Testimony and Lopez Report

politics, nor has it undertaken such activity anytime in the ~~recent past. Nevertheless, any public confirmation by the~~ U.S. Government of those activities would risk an adverse reaction. Such adverse reaction would impact on current Mexico City Station operations and be harmful to U.S. interests.

3. (S) As has ~~been~~ described to the Board in previous briefings by the ~~Mexican branch chief~~, Mexicans guard their sovereignty carefully. Nothing will infuriate them more than allegations of CIA meddling in their internal politics. In fact, earlier this year, the Mexican Government postponed a visit to Mexico by the DCI for fear that it might be perceived (and exploited) by the Mexican media and political opposition as the CIA being called in to assist with handling the problem of the Peoples' Revolutionary Army.

4. (S) The fact that the CIA activity to which the Mexicans would object occurred more than 30 years ago will not lessen the reaction. Release of the Scelso comments would risk an adverse reaction from the Mexicans, which would likely include calls for an examination by the Mexican Government of current CIA activities. This could lead to increased scrutiny of Station operations and personnel and could jeopardize our unilateral activities. It could also have a chilling effect on activities conducted jointly with the Mexican services, who will be reluctant to engage in programs that could become subject to public scrutiny and political debate.

5. (S) Furthermore, the fact that these statements were made by Scelso amounts to an official confirmation of the underlying facts, making it very difficult for CIA to protect the same or similar information from further release in the future. Speculation in books, articles, and other publications, or disclosures by Congress are often perceived by the public as evidence that that information is in the public domain and therefore is no longer classified. The CIA has nevertheless been able to legally protect the information from unauthorized disclosure. The courts have held that because there has been no official confirmation, (i.e. declassification by the appropriate CIA official) the CIA may continue to protect from release ~~the~~ the information at issue even when there has been widespread public discussion on the issue in question.

6. (S) In this case, should there ~~by~~ be a question raised as to the classification status of documents on the political program referred to by Scelso, it would be difficult to convince a court that such information had not been declassified because of the release by the Board. Scelso was a long-time CIA employee who was in charge of the investigation by the Agency into the assassination of the

President, and his testimony was taken under oath, with the knowledge of the Agency, and in a classified setting. Furthermore, the attached letter to Louis Stokes, Chairman of the Select Committee on Assassination from former Acting DCI Frank Carlucci also indicates that Scelso was acting as an official of the CIA. The DCI states that any classified testimony made by Agency staff before the Committees would be considered "authorized provision" of the information. This was to ensure that "all persons respond fully and truthfully" to the Committee. Carlucci's letter, especially taken together with the first few pages of Scelso's testimony, make it clear that Scelso was speaking as an official of the CIA.

New ¶

7. (S) A court would, therefore, probably find that Scelso's statements were not just merely speculation by a former Agency employee, but in fact, were official confirmation of the political action program. Anything suggesting official confirmation of classified information would lead a judge to the conclusion that the information at issue had been declassified by the CIA. This would make it very difficult for CIA to continue to protect this information from unauthorized disclosure. When confusion arises as to the classification status of information, it could lead to complicated legal proceedings and protracted and unnecessary litigation at great expense to all parties.

II. Liaison with Mexico

"We did not have any source of Cuban employees. We only had ***Mexican police***"...We had a whole reporting set up there with that, two of them, who watched things like that. (Scelso pg. 185).

8. (S) Release by the Board of Scelso's comments about the Mexican police in conjunction with surveillance coverage of the Mexico City airport could similarly have a chilling effect on our current liaison relationship with the Mexicans. The Station has worked, and continues to work, with liaison against compatible targets, including tracking the arrival and departure at the Mexico City airport of targets of interest. Although the targets have obviously changed since the time that Scelso is speaking of, these surveillance operations are ongoing. The success of these current joint operations could be threatened by any revelation today of Mexican cooperation with the CIA in the past.

9. (S) CIA objects to this release on similar grounds as stated in the prior section - disclosure of the Scelso comments would constitute official acknowledgment by CIA of the assistance provided by Mexican liaison to the Agency. Such acknowledgment could affect not only current operations

described above, but also result in reluctance by Mexican liaison to provide similar assistance in the future. The Mexican Government would likely be subject to criticism by groups and individuals opposed on nationalism and sovereignty grounds to such close cooperation with the U.S. Government and, even more so, with the CIA. The continued success of CIA cooperation with the Mexicans, whether it be with ~~the President,~~ the intelligence service, or ~~the police,~~ any other Mexican government entity depends on the fact that those relationships are, and continue to be, secret.

10. (S) CIA requests that the Board continue to withhold this phrase from release and substitute in "other sources" or something similar to this. Omitting the fact that the airport information was obtained from Mexican counterparts would probably leave the impression that the information was obtained unilaterally. Although this still presents some risk to national security, it does achieve some level of protection to the Station's equities with liaison.

III. Phillip Agee

(S) "That is, the variety and number of telephone taps, surveillance teams, photo operations and other technical operations ***is exposed by Agee in his book***. That exceeds anyplace else that we had in the world by a lot..." (Scelso, pg. 141)

11. (S) CIA objects to the release of the highlighted phrase because, for reasons described in Section 1, it amounts to official CIA confirmation of the existence of a teltap operation conducted jointly with the Mexicans and with close collaboration with the President of Mexico. As this Board is well aware, CIA has consistently requested, the protection of liaison involvement in this teltap operation. As the Board has agreed with CIA's position on this matter, the only issue is whether this statement reveals what we have agreed meets the criteria for continued protection under the JFK Act.

12. (S) For the Board's convenience, several relevant pages from Agee's book (Inside the Company: CIA Diary) are attached. These pages explain in great detail the teltap operation and the fact that it was conducted jointly between the CIA and the Mexicans. Although such disclosures by former employees are disturbing, they do not amount to official confirmation of the underlying information. Standing by itself, Agee's book can be dismissed by the Agency as speculation, and do not compromise CIA's ability to keep the information classified. Scelso's testimony, however, amounts to official confirmation of Agee's book,

and does effect the Agency's ability to protect the information from further release. Equally troubling is the fact that Scelso's testimony could be read to confirm not only what is accurate in Agee's book, but also what is inaccurate.

12. (S) Furthermore, the language used by Scelso is clear. The use of the phrase "exposed by Agee in his book" does not allow for any other interpretation except that Agee's description of the teltap is accurate. If Scelso had used other language, such as "has been written about elsewhere", the existence of the joint teltap operation would be protected. We request that the Board protect the phrase as it is and use the above substitute language. Such substitute language would not alter the story of the JFK Assassination, yet would still allow for the protection of the joint operation.

13. (S) While the connection between Agee's book and Scelso's testimony may at first seem attenuated, anyone involved in the review process conducted by this Board will know that it is not. Many individuals follow the decisions of this Board closely, and Agee's writings about the CIA are also well known. It is to be expected that those who read the Scelso report would then turn to Agee's book.

John F. Pereira

From the Desk of Linda C. Cipriani

NOTE FOR: J. Barry Harrelson
FROM: Linda C. Cipriani
DATE: 09/26/96 12:22:04 PM
SUBJECT: Agee Memo - New draft

Here it is... with Jeremy's improvements. Please read it carefully as I had to rush through this. Some of Jeremy's comments were slight wording changes so as not to offend "the Board" so you may not notice much change. The biggest substantive change was on my FOIA section (I have skillfully crafted this section to avoid the use of that four letter word!). Please note there is one more paragraph now because I did add a bit about Scelso being an "official". And don't forget to attach to Stokes-DCI letter which I will fax back to you.

Have fun - and let me know if you need help.

AGEEMEMO.DOC

CC:

SECRET

23 August 1996

Note For: Fred Wickham, DO
Eleanor Neiman, DO
Mike Luce, DO/Mexico
Valerie Patterson, DO/EA
Christine Hegeman, DO/EA
Linda Cipriani, OGC

From: J. Barry Harrelson, CSI/HRG

Subject: Meeting with ARRB Staff

1. Thursday afternoon I met with Dave Marwell, Executive Director for the ARRB, and two of his staff, Jeremy Gunn and Mary McAuliffe. I briefed them on the four releases in the Lopez Report and Scelso Testimony that had been identified as potential appeal items, and on the Agency's concerns re the Australian documents. I requested that the Board reconsider the release of the statements on Mexico City political action programs, Scelso's comment on Agee, the reference to the Mexican Police as a source and Warrenton as site of the Agency's Record Center.

2. Marwell agreed to send a "staff recommendation" to the Board recommending that they delay the release of these four items to hear additional evidence from the Agency. The rest of the Lopez Report and Scelso Testimony would be released on schedule. If the Board accepts the staff's recommendation, the four items will be addressed at the next Washington meeting (27 September). If the Board rejects the staff's recommendation, then we have the option of appealing to the President. Marwell and Gunn seemed confident that the Board would agree to delay the release.

3. Gunn requested that the Agency's additional evidence on these four items (if provided in writing) be to the ARRB staff by 23 September. The Agency can also brief the Board members at the 27 September meeting. As I understand it, DO/Mexico (Mike L.) will be preparing evidence memos on "political action programs" and "Mexican police" issues and OGC (Linda C.) will take the lead on Agee. I will contact the DA/IRO (Don Hatch) on the Warrenton issue.

4. Concerning the Australian documents, Marwell agreed to delay Board action until the 16 October meeting. The Agency's proposal on these documents should be sent to the ARRB staff as soon as possible.

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Testimony of then Retired DO officer
John SCELSO (pseudonym)
to the HSCA, 16 May 1978

political action program — p. 64

largest teltap coverage; 30 lines — pp. 52, 53, 56, 57

"is exposed by Agee in his book" — p. 141

The phrase, if released, could tie together what we've been trying to protect - primarily a joint teltap with the Mexicans and close collaboration with the President of Mexico. It also gives credence to the many allegations of Agee, which the Agency has neither confirmed nor denied.

coverage of the airport — p. 185

in addition to "Mexican Police" being a liaison relationship, it shows our access to airport control items

Please review the attached pages as determined by the Assassinations Records Review Board members

Yellow highlighted passages are as CIA submitted information to the Board, redacted

Bracketed passages FYI as Board upheld deletions

been handled in any different manner?

Mr. Scelso. It would have been in the case of dissemination of information about him, but I do not think that any operational action would have been taken to apprehend him or to contact him or to try to force him back to the United States.

Mr. Goldsmith. What about in terms of -- how would the dissemination have been treated differently?

Mr. Scelso. Well, it simply means that we would have disseminated any additional information that we got.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did Headquarters ever criticize the Mexico City station for failure to send this information?

Mr. Scelso. No. That was not because we were trying to go easy on them, it is simply because it is in the nature of the business. What you are trying to do is engage, as I used to say, in important illegal manipulations of society, secretly.

We were running, at that time, a vast political action program in Mexico City to try to swing Mexico around from its Leftist direction to a middle of the road direction and it succeeded. I do not know whether you informed yourself about the magnitude of our political action program there at the time -- absolutely enormous.

We were trying to follow the Soviets and all the satellites and the Cubans. At the same time, the main thrust of

Mr. Scelo. Yes.

Now, why did they not report everything they found out?

Mr. Goldsmith. Answer your own question.

Mr. Scelo. The telephone center envoy was manned by principally Mexican supervision of an American, or Mexican-American. These people were just inundated with information and apparently did not extract this and transmit it back to Washington.

The later contacts with the Cuban Embassy, and so on, which only were divulged after the assassination. It is an enormous problem. Mexico had one of the biggest and most active telephone intercept operations in the whole world and the job of processing this material is just impossible.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let's go through this step by step, although I was not going to do this at this time. I am going to modify the line of inquiry somewhat.

Do you know how many telephone intercepts there were in the Mexico City station?

Mr. Scelo. How many lines were being tapped?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, at the Cuban and then at the Soviet.

Mr. Scelo. I think there are about 30 lines being tapped altogether. That is just the number that sticks in my mind.

Mr. Goldsmith. Thirty meaning a total of thirty from both the Soviet and the Cuban?

Mr. Scelo. And various security suspects.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would the security suspects to related to the Soviet or Cuban?

Mr. Scelo. Some of them were American Communists living there whom we tapped at the specific request of J. Edgar Hoover.

Mr. Goldsmith. Of those thirty lines how many, at your best estimate, would have been for the Soviet and Cubans?

Mr. Scelo. However many outside telephone lines they had.

Mr. Goldsmith. You think just about every outside phone?

Mr. Scelo. I think they tapped all the outside lines.

Mr. Goldsmith. How certain of that are you?

Mr. Scelo. Well, this is just based on my recollection, going back 15 years.

Mr. Goldsmith. In any event, your earlier comment was that the telephone surveillance operation in Mexico City was one of the most extensive in the world?

Mr. Scelo. Yes. And of course, they taped a great deal which they could not exploit. They could not later listen to it; they did not have time. They used to listen to it sort of spottily, you see, and attempt then to exploit what was the most important.

Mr. Goldsmith. Your answer to my earlier question as to why the information on Oswald was not sent to the

(Pause)

Mr. Scelo. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. I have a few questions to ask you on that. This refers to the envoy operation that was the joint operation conducted by the Mexicans and the Americans and I believe this indicates that there were 30 lines, in fact, connected at one time, so that your early testimony was, in all likelihood, accurate.

I am going to have to ask you also to read the section marked number 3, Oswald coverage.

Mr. Scelo. What is that report, if I may ask?

Mr. Goldsmith. This is taken from the 1977 Inspector General Report.

Mr. Scelo. I see.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please read the section marked Oswald Coverage through to the end of the paragraph on page 162.

(Pause)

On page 161, the section where it says: "Oswald Coverage. In mid-62, the Mexican officer in charge of the envoy, the joint tap operation, asked the American officer at the envoy listening post for the telephone numbers of the Soviet, Cuban and satellite embassies in anticipation of possible coverage."

The question I have for you is as follows. It would seem, from the earlier paragraph, that the liaison operation

was already in effect, so why would it have been necessary for the Mexican officer in charge to ask the American officer for the telephone numbers?

Mr. Scelo. The Mexicans were probably tapping other things at that time, not these targets. They were tapping other Mexicans, and so on. We had our own unilateral tap operations --

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that.

Mr. Scelo. -- on those important targets.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, are you saying that prior to 1962 the liaison operations with the Mexicans did not cover the Soviet, Cuban and satellite embassies?

Mr. Scelo. That is what that says. I do not really recall. That would have been in mid-62. That was just about the time I was coming onboard in the Mexico desk. And I do not recall what the previous status was.

I do recall that they certainly did ask -- they suddenly disclosed the intent to tap certain lines which we were tapping unilaterally.

Mr. Goldsmith. It indicates that the liaison operation had taps on 30 lines. If it was not the Soviet, Cuban and satellite embassies, it makes us wonder what it could have been.

Mr. Scelo. Mexican politicians and security suspects; Mexican Communist Party people. There were three or four or

Mr. Goldsmith. Is the Mexico City's station's operations one of the most sensitive of all of the stations at the Agency?

Mr. Scelso. It was then. That is, the variety and number of telephone taps, surveillance teams, photo operations and other technical operations is exposed by Agee in his book. That exceeds anyplace else that we had in the world by a lot. There is no other station in the world that has that good operations.

Then came Caracas. That got to be real good. Nothing like it in Europe.

Mr. Goldsmith. I would like to draw your attention to a cable which, unfortunately, I do not have with me. The cable is referred to in Book 5 of the Senate report, written by Thomas Karamessinas to the Mexico City station in which he indicated and said the arrest of Sylvia Deran would jeopordize U.S. freedom of action.

Do you remember that cable?

Mr. Scelso. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know why it was sent?

Mr. Scelso. At that time, we were not sure that Oswald might not have been a Cuban agent, and the arrest of a foreign consular person was quite a serious matter under international law.

Although Sylvia Duran was a Mexican citizen, I believe, nevertheless, I did not think -- Karamessinas may not have

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Appendix 1

Alphabetical and numerical listing of CIA employees, agents and collaborators and organizations controlled, financed and influenced by the CIA.

ACOSTA VELASCO, JORGE. Nephew of Ecuadorean President, Jose Maria Velasco. Minister of the Treasury and Minister of Government. Informant and political-action agent of the Quito station.

AGENCIA ORBE LATINOAMERICANO. Feature news service serving most of Latin America. Financed and controlled by the CIA through the Santiago, Chile, station.

AGRIBUSINESS DEVELOPMENT INC. (LAAD). Provided cover for CIA officer Bruce Berckmans, q.v.

AGUERRONDO, MARIO. Uruguayan Army colonel and former Montevideo Chief of Police. Close station liaison collaborator.

AIR AMERICA. CIA-owned airline for paramilitary operations, mainly in the Far East.

ALARCON, ALBERTO. Guayaquil businessman and Liberal Party activist. Principal agent for CIA student operations in Ecuador. Cryptonym: ECLOSE.

ALBORNOZ, ALFREDO. Ecuadorean Minister of Government (internal security). Close collaborator of the Quito station.

ALLEN, JOHN. CIA operations officer at Camp Peary training base, formerly assigned in the Near East.

ALLIANCE FOR ANTI-TOTALITARIAN EDUCATION. Propaganda mechanism of the Montevideo station.

ALMEIDA, WILSON. Publisher and editor of *Voz Universitaria*, q.v., a university student newspaper. Propaganda agent for the Quito station.

ALONZO OLIVE, RAUL. Cuban engineer in sugar industry. Member of commercial delegation to Brazil and Uruguay. Recruited by the CIA in Montevideo before return to Cuba.

AMADOR MARQUEZ, ENRIQUE. Labour and political-action agent of Guayaquil base. Minister of Economy.

AMAYA QUINTANA, ENRIQUE. Leader of the Peruvian Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), recruited in Guayaquil as a penetration agent. Resettled by the CIA in Mexico.

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES. The US member of the Public Service International

INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF PETROLEUM AND CHEMICAL WORKERS (IFPCW). The ITS for this industry set up originally by the CIA through the US Oil Workers International Union.

INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF PLANTATION, AGRICULTURAL AND ALLIED WORKERS (IFPAAW). The international trade secretariat for rural workers. Used by the CIA for labour operations.

INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF WOMEN LAWYERS. Organization used by the CIA for propaganda operations.

INTERNATIONAL POLICE ACADEMY. CIA-controlled police training school under AID cover in Washington DC. Formerly the Inter-American Police Academy founded in Panama by the Panama station.

INTERNATIONAL POLICE SERVICES SCHOOL. CIA training school for police in Washington under commercial cover.

INTERNATIONAL STUDENT CONFERENCE (ISC). *See* COORDINATING SECRETARIAT OF NATIONAL UNIONS OF STUDENTS (COSEC).

INTERNATIONAL TRADE SECRETARIATS. A generic description of the international trade-union organizations having as members the national unions of workers in a particular industry. There are 15–20 ITS's most of which have been used by the CIA for labour operations. Some have headquarters in Europe, others in the US but close relations maintained with the ICFTU in Brussels.

INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT WORKERS FEDERATION (ITF). The international trade secretariat for transport industries. Used by the CIA for labour operations. *See* JOAQUIN (JACK) OTERO.

JACOME, FRANCINE. American married to Ecuadorean. Quito agent who wrote cover letters to Luis Toroella, q.v., and served as transcriber and courier for telephone-tap operation. Cryptonym: ECDOXY.

JARAMILLO, JAIME. Velasquista leader and Quito station penetration agent.

JAUREGUI, ARTURO. Secretary-General of the Inter-American Regional Labor Organization (ORIT), q.v., in Mexico City. CIA agent.

JAUREGUIZA, –. Montevideo police commissioner in charge of movements of non-domiciled population. Montevideo station liaison collaborator.

JONES, DEREK. Agent of the Montevideo station used in operation to break the code system of the Embassy of the United Arab Republic (Egypt).

KARAMESSINES, THOMAS. Assistant Deputy Director for Plans and later Deputy Director for Plans.

KAUFMAN, WALTER J. Chief of Mexico branch of Western Hemisphere Division.

KINDSCHI, JACK. CIA operations officer in Stockholm using non-official cover of Washington DC public relations firm Robert Mullen Co. Assigned to Mexico City with same cover.

KING, COLONEL, J. C. Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division of the DDP.

KLADENSKY, OTTO. Quito Oldsmobile dealer and station agent for intelligence on the Czech diplomatic mission. Also the cutout to Reinaldo Varea Donoso, Ecuadorean Vice-President, q.v. Cryptonym: ECTOSOME later DICTOSOME.

LABOR COMMITTEE FOR DEMOCRATIC ACTION. Propaganda mechanism of the Montevideo station.

LADD, RAYMOND. Quito station administrative officer also in charge of certain operations.

LADENBURG, ARTHUR. CIA operations officer in Mexico City under non-official cover. Later assigned to Santiago, Chile.

LIBIDINAL. Mexico City station postal intercept operation. True cryptonym and true names of agents unknown.

LICALLA. One of three observation posts overlooking the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. Names of agents forgotten.

LICOBRA. Cryptonym for operations targeted by Mexico City station against the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and the Mexican Foreign Ministry and Ministry of Government.

LICOWL-1. Owner of small grocery store near Soviet Embassy, Mexico City. CIA agent. True name forgotten.

LICOZY-1. Double-agent of Mexico City station against the KGB. True name forgotten.

LICOZY-3. Double-agent of Mexico City station against the KGB. True name forgotten.

LICOZY-5. Double-agent of the Mexico City station against the KGB. True name forgotten.

LIDENY. Mexico City station unilateral telephone-tapping operation. True cryptonym and true names of agents unknown.

LIEMBRACE. Mexico City station surveillance team. Names of team members unknown.

LIENVOY. Joint telephone-tapping operation between Mexico City station and Mexican security service. Names of agents unknown.

LIFIRE. Mexico City station travel control and general investigations team. True names unknown.

LILINK. An operation in Mexico City to provide non-official cover for

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nym: LISAMPAN) is still in the 'interference-complaint-testing' stage.

Another important operation directed against the Cubans is a sophisticated provocation that won the CIA Intelligence Medal for Stan Archenhold,‡ the case officer who conceived it. The operation consisted of a series of letters sent to the Cuban intelligence service in their Mexico City Embassy from a person who purported to be a CIA officer trying to help them. The letters purport to implicate Joaquin Ordoqui, a respected, old-guard leader of the Cuban Communist Party and a high-ranking military leader, as a CIA agent. The letters are based on information from Carlos Manuel Pellecer, the Guatemalan exile and penetration agent, who was closely associated with Ordoqui and Marcos Rodriguez when all three lived in Mexico City during the late 1950s. The letters continue to be sent to Cuban intelligence although Ordoqui was arrested in 1964, and the desired controversy and dissension in the Cuban revolutionary leadership followed.

As the cover of Sherry, the chief of the Cuban operations section, is in the Embassy consular section, he has been able to meet several of the Cuban consular officers directly. However, his main agent for direct assessment of the Cubans is Leander Vourvoulias, Consul of Greece and President of the Consular Corps.

Support Operations

The support operations must also be detailed. The joint operation for telephone tapping, LIENVOY, is effected in cooperation with the Mexican authorities and has a capacity for about forty lines. The station provides the equipment, the technical assistance, couriers and transcribers, while the Mexicans make the connections in the exchanges and maintain the listening posts. In addition to monitoring the lines of the communist diplomatic missions and those of Mexican revolutionary groups, LIENVOY also covers special cases. For years the telephones of ex-President Cárdenas and his daughter have been tapped, and recently tapping has started on that of Luis Quintanilla, a Mexican intellectual who is planning a trip to Hanoi with the publisher of the *Miami News* and with a fellow of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions in Santa Barbara. Reports on plans for this trip are sent immediately to the White House.

The station also has its own unilateral telephone-tapping operation which is limited to special cases where the involvement of the Mexicans is thought to be undesirable. Connections for this operation are made outside the exchanges by telephone company engineers who work as station agents, as in the case of the bugging of the Cuban Embassy (LISAMPAN). However this is restricted as far as possible in order to avoid damaging relations with the Mexicans in the event of discovery.

Travel control, general investigations and occasional surveillance are the duties of a six-man team called LIFIRE. They obtain flight-travel lists from the airport, which are passed daily to the station and take photographs of passengers to and from communist countries and of their passports as they pass through immigration.

Another eight-man surveillance team, known as LIEMBRACE, has vehicles (including a Volkswagen photo-van) and radio-communications equipment and is mainly concerned with Soviet/satellite and Cuban targets. It is administered by Jim Anderson,‡ who also controls another eight-man team (LIRICE), similarly equipped, which deals with the Mexican revolutionaries and other miscellaneous targets.

Postal interception is mainly directed towards the mail from communist countries, but can occasionally be used to get correspondence from selected Mexican addresses.

As in every station, a variety of agents assists in support tasks which they perform in the course of their ordinary jobs. For processing the immigration papers for station non-official cover personnel, for example, Judd Austin,‡ one of the US lawyers in Goodrich, Dalton, Little and Riquelme (the principal law firm serving American subsidiaries) is used. The Executive Vice-President of the American Chamber of Commerce in Mexico City, Al Wichtrich,‡ channels political information to the station that he picks up in his normal work with American and Mexican businessmen. For technical support the station has an officer of TSD under Embassy cover with a workshop and qualifications in audio, flaps and seals, and photography.

that they were engaged in political activities. The Chinese had, in fact, been using the NCNA office for propaganda and support to pro-Chinese revolutionary organizations in Mexico and Central America.

Central American Exiles

Mexico has traditionally been a haven for political exiles from Central American countries including communists and other extreme leftists. Several Central American parties, including the Guatemalans, maintain liaison sections in Mexico City in order to keep lines open to the Soviets, Cubans and others. They operate semi-clandestinely for the most part in order to avoid repression from the Mexican government.

Washington D C
20 December 1966

Because of the strategic importance of Mexico to the US, its size and proximity, and the abundance of enemy activities, the Mexico City station is the largest in the hemisphere. Altogether the station has some fifteen operations officers under State Department cover in the Embassy political section, plus about twelve more officers under assorted non-official covers outside the Embassy. In addition, a sizeable support staff of communications officers, technical services, intelligence assistants, records clerks and secretaries bring the overall station personnel total to around fifty.

Liaison Operations

Dominating the station operational programme is the LITEMPO‡ project which is administered by Winston Scott,‡ the Chief of Station in Mexico City since 1956, with the assistance of Annie Goodpasture,‡ a case officer who has also been at the station for some years. This project embraces a complicated series of operational support programmes to the various Mexican civilian security forces for the purpose of intelligence exchange, joint

operations and constant upgrading of Mexican internal intelligence collection and public security functions.

At the top of the LITEMPO operation is the Mexican President, Gustavo Diaz Ordaz,‡ who has worked extremely closely with the station since he became Minister of Government in the previous administration of Adolfo Lopez Mateos‡ (1958–64). Scott had also developed a very close working relationship with Lopez Mateos, and, since Diaz Ordaz became President two years ago, Scott has been working closely with the current Minister of Government, Luis Echeverria.‡ Thus the LITEMPO project focuses at the top on the President and the current Minister of Government who will be the second consecutive choice of PRI leaders to pass from internal security to the presidency.

Scott's chummy relationship with Diaz Ordaz none the less has its problems. In 1964 Fulton Freeman went to Mexico City as Ambassador to crown a Foreign Service career that had started in the same Embassy in the 1930s. He is expected to retire after the 1968 Olympic Games. At the time of his assignment to Mexico City Freeman's expectations of meaningful diplomatic relations with Diaz Ordaz collided with the President's preference for dealing with Scott, and Freeman was relegated to protocol contacts with the President while his diplomatic talents focused on the Foreign Minister. The problem of who would deal with the President was confused somewhat by the Ambassador's insistence, not long after arrival, on a detailed briefing about the station operational programme, which Scott refused. Eventually both Scott and the Ambassador visited the White House, where President Johnson settled matters according to the wishes of the Agency and of his friend Diaz Ordaz. Scott continued, of course, to work with the President and the Ambassador never got the full briefing he had demanded. Since then the relations between Scott and the Ambassador have warmed, but the Ambassador forbids any station operations directed against the Mexican Foreign Ministry.

While Scott frequently meets the President and the Minister of Government, two non-official cover case officers handle the day-to-day contact with the chiefs of the security services subordinate to Echeverria. One of these officers is a former FBI agent who worked in the legal attaché's office in the Mexico City Embassy - the legal attaché is usually the FBI office in an American

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embassy. The FBI officer had left the FBI to come with the station, but pains have been taken to conceal his CIA employment in order to avoid the bad blood that would result from the CIA's 'stealing' of an FBI officer. The two non-official cover officers are the equivalent of an AID Public Safety mission but in Mexico this function is performed secretly by the station in deference to Mexican nationalist sensitivities – as is the case in Argentina. Through the LITEMPO project we are currently providing advice and equipment for a new secret communications network to function between Diaz Ordaz's office and principal cities in the rest of the country. Other joint operations with the Mexican security services include travel control, telephone tapping and repressive action.

The station also prepares a daily intelligence summary for Diaz Ordaz with a section on activities of Mexican revolutionary organizations and communist diplomatic missions and a section on international developments based on information from headquarters. Other reports, often relating to a single subject, are passed to Diaz Ordaz, Echeverria and top security officials. These reports, like the daily round-up, include information from station unilateral penetration agents with due camouflaging to protect the identity of the sources. The station is much better than are the Mexican services, and is thus of great assistance to the authorities in planning for raids, arrests and other repressive action.

Liaison between Scott and the Mexican military intelligence services consists mainly of exchange of information, in order to keep a foot in the door for future eventualities. The US military attachés, moreover, are in constant contact with their Mexican military intelligence counterparts and their reports are received regularly by the station.

Stan Watson,‡ the Mexico City Deputy Chief of Station, has been meeting with a South Korean CIA officer who was recently sent under diplomatic cover to monitor North Korean soundings for establishment of missions in Mexico and Central America.

Communist Party Operations

The station CP section consists of two case officers, Wade Thomas‡ and Ben Ramirez,‡ both under Embassy cover, plus two case officers outside the station under non-official cover: Bob Driscoll,‡ a retired operations officer now working under contract, and Julian Zambianco who was transferred from Guayaquil to Mexico City about a year ago. These officers are in charge of agent and technical penetrations against the revolutionary organizations of importance. The quality of this intelligence is high, although not as high as it was before 1963. In late 1962 Carlos Manuel Pellecer,‡ the station's most important communist party penetration-agent, broke openly with communism by publishing a book. He was a leader of the Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT) and had been Minister of Labor in the Arbenz government during the 1950s. However, after the Agency-sponsored overthrow of the Arbenz government Pellecer made his way to Mexico City where for years he was the station's best source (cryptonym LINLUCK) on all the revolutionary organizations in Mexico, not just the Guatemalan exiles. His book, of course, was financed by the station and distributed by the Agency all over Latin America. Pellecer is still being used by the Mexico City station as a propaganda agent, as with other former penetration agents who formally break with communism without revealing their years of work as spies – Eudocio Ravines,‡ the well-known Peruvian defector from communism is a parallel case. Another book by Pellecer, also financed by the station, has just appeared. This book is a continuation of CIA exploitation of the Marcos Rodriguez and Joaquin Ordoqui cases in Cuba, and is aimed at denigration of the Cuban revolution.

The station also collects information about communists from the US living in Mexico. Many of them arrived during the McCarthy period and some have subsequently become Mexican citizens. Information about them is mainly of interest to the FBI, which calls them the American Communist Group in Mexico City (ACGMC). Information collected about them includes that obtained through the LIENVOY telephone-tapping operation described below.

The station also receives copies of reports from FBI penetration operations against Mexican revolutionary organizations. Mexico is the only country in Latin America, except Puerto Rico, where the FBI continued operations against the local left when the CIA took over in 1947. The FBI intelligence is of high quality.

Soviet/Satellite Operations

The largest section in the station is that covering Soviet/satellite operations. It has four case officers, three intelligence assistants and a secretary, all under Embassy cover, and four case officers under non-official cover. It is headed by Paul Dillon‡ and the other official cover case officers are Donald Vogel,‡ Cynthia Hausman and Robert Steele.‡ A number of sensitive operations are underway.

The station has two observation posts in front of the Soviet Embassy, which cover the entrances, plus a third observation post in the back of the Embassy to provide coverage of the gardens. The LICALLA observation post in the back is the closest of five houses bordering the Embassy property – all five are owned by the station. Several years ago films were made of Soviets conversing in the garden, but attempts by Russian lip-readers to discover their conversations were unsuccessful. From one of the front OP's, radio contact is maintained with the LIEMBRACE surveillance team for signalling when a particular Soviet surveillance target leaves the Embassy, his route and other data. Photos are regularly taken from all the OP's of Soviets and their families and all visitors to the Embassy. When visitors use vehicles, photographs are taken of their licence plates for tracing. Occasionally the LICALLA OP is used for electronic monitoring, since it is close to the Embassy, but so far attempts to pick up radiations from Soviet cryptographic equipment have been unsuccessful.

In addition to the LIEMBRACE surveillance team, several other support operations include coverage of the Soviets. Through the LIENVOY operation, Soviet telephones are constantly monitored, and through the LIFIRE travel-control operation photographs of travel documents are obtained along with data on arrivals and departures. Monitoring of Mexican diplomatic communications reveals requests for Mexican visas by Soviet officials, including the diplomatic couriers. In addition, NSA is also monitoring several communications systems involving 'burst' transmissions from the USSR to as yet unidentified agents believed to be in Mexico – possibly Soviet intelligence officers assigned abroad as 'illegals', with false identity and non-official cover.

The station runs between fifteen and twenty access agents against the Soviets with varying degrees of effectiveness and reliability. Several of these agents are suspected of having been recruited by the Soviets for use as double agents against the station. Two of the most important of the current access-agents are Katherine Manjarrez,‡ Secretary of the Foreign Press Association, and her husband – both of whom are targeted against the Soviet press attaché and the *Tass* correspondent. Others are LICOWL-1‡ and LIOVAL-1.‡

LICOWL-1 is the owner of a tiny grocery store situated in front of the Soviet Embassy where the Soviets buy odds and ends including their soft drinks – TSD is studying ways of bugging a wooden soft-drink case or the bottles themselves. More important, LICOWL-1 is involved at the moment in an operation against the Embassy *zavhoz* (administrative officer), who spends considerable time chatting with the agent. Because Silnikov, the *zavhoz*, has been on the prowl for a lover – or so he said to LICOWL-1 – the station decided to recruit a young Mexican girl as bait. An appropriate girl was obtained through BESABER,‡ an agent who is normally targeted against Polish intelligence officers and who runs a ceramics business specializing in souvenirs. By loitering at LICOWL-1's store the girl attracted Silnikov's attention, and a hot necking session in a back room at the store led to several serious afternoon sessions at the girl's apartment nearby – obtained especially for this operation. Silnikov's virility is astonishing both the girl and the station, which is recording and photographing the sessions without the knowledge of the girl. Although promiscuity among Soviets is not abnormal, relationships with local girls are forbidden. Eventually it will be decided whether to try blackmail against Silnikov or to provoke disruption by sending tapes and photos to the Embassy if the blackmail is refused.

LIOVAL-1‡ is not as interesting a case but is more important. The agent is an American who teaches English in Mexico City and is an ardent fisherman. Through fishing he became acquainted with Pavel Yatskov, the Soviet Consul and a known senior KGB officer – possibly the Mexico City *rezident* (KGB chief). Yatskov and the agent spend one or two week-ends per month off in the mountains fishing and have developed a very close friendship.

When Yatskov is transferred back to Moscow – he has already been in Mexico for some years – we shall decide whether to try to defect him through LIOVAL-1. Recently Peter Deriabin,‡ the well-known KGB defector from the 1950s who is now a US citizen and full-time CIA employee, went to Mexico City to study the voluminous reports on Yatskov written by LIOVAL-1. He concluded that there is a strong possibility that LIOVAL-1 has been recruited by Yatskov and is reporting on Paul Dillon, the station officer in charge of this case. Nevertheless, the operation continues while the counter-intelligence aspects are studied further.

The station double-agent cases against the Soviets, LICOZY-1,‡ LICOZY-3‡ and LICOZY-5,‡ are all being wound up for lack of productivity or problems of control. One of these agents, LICOZY-3, is an American living in Philadelphia who was recruited by the Soviets while a student in Mexico, but who reported the recruitment and worked for the Mexico City station. He worked for the FBI after returning to the US – the Soviet case officer was a UN official at one time – but recently Soviet interest in him has fallen off and the FBI turned the case back over to the Agency for termination.

Against the Czechs and the Poles many of the same types of operation are targeted. Access agents, observation posts, telephone tapping, surveillance and travel control are continuous although with somewhat less intensity than against the Soviets. In the Yugoslav Embassy the code clerk has been recruited by the CIA as has one of the Embassy's secretaries.

Until the *New China News Agency* (NCNA) office was closed last month by the Mexican government, the Soviet/satellite section of the station was responsible for following the movements of the Chinese communists. Telephone intercepts through LIENVOY and occasional surveillance by the LIRICE team were directed against them, but the most important intelligence collected against them was from the bugging of their offices. The audio operation was supported by the Far East Division in headquarters, who sent an operations officer and transcribers to Mexico City. Now that the NCNA offices are closed, the audio equipment will be removed and the station will continue to follow up the many leads coming from the bugging operation.

Cuban Operations

The Cuban operations section consists of two case officers, Francis Sherry and Joe Piccolo, and a secretary under Embassy cover and one case officer under non-official cover. An observation post for photographic coverage and radio contact with the LIEMBRACE surveillance team is functioning, as well as LIENVOY telephone monitoring and LIFIRE airport travel control. Through the LIFIRE team the station obtains regular clandestine access to the *Prensa Latina* pouch from Havana, and copies of correspondence between PL headquarters in Havana and its correspondents throughout the hemisphere are forwarded to the stations concerned.

Through the LITEMPO liaison operation the Mexican immigration service provides special coverage of all travellers to and from Havana on the frequent Cubana flights. Each traveller is photographed and his passport is stamped with arrival or departure cachets indicating Havana travel. The purpose is to frustrate the Cuban practice of issuing visas on separate slips of paper instead of in the passport so as to obscure travel. Prior to each Cubana departure the station is notified of all passengers so that name checks can be made. In the case of US citizens, the Mexican service obliges by preventing departure when requested by the station.

The most important current operation targeted against the Cuban mission is an attempted audio penetration using the telephone system. Telephone company engineers working in the LIDENY tapping operation will eventually install new wall-boxes for the Embassy telephones in which sub-miniature transmitters with switches will have been cast by TSD. At the moment, however, the engineers are causing deliberate interference in Embassy telephones by technical means in the exchange. Each time the Embassy calls the telephone company to complain of interference on the lines, the engineers report back that everything in the exchange is in order. Eventually, as the interference continues, the engineers will check street connections and finally arrive to check the instruments in the Embassy. They will find the wall-boxes 'defective' and will replace them with the bugged boxes cast by TSD. Right now, however, this operation (crypto-

Mr. Goldsmith. What do you mean, things like this happened all the time?

Mr. Scelso. Planes were held for travellers who would otherwise miss them, for Cuban officials, and so on.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did the Agency ever actually investigate this particular matter?

Mr. Scelso. It investigated to the extent that there was nothing left to investigate. The plane was gone. The man was on it. He had not identified himself before he left.

We had very complete coverage of the Mexico City Airport and watched the Cuban flights closely, but where it sometimes happened that an important Cuban official would come late, he would go directly to the plane without going through travel controls.

At that time, the man was gone. There was no picture of him. Nobody looked at his passport. Period.

Mr. Goldsmith. You did not bother to ask any Cuban employees in the Airport about the man?

Mr. Scelso. We did not have any source of Cuban employees. We only had Mexican police.

Mr. Goldsmith. Were any of them questioned about him?

Mr. Scelso. Yes, this was a routine thing. We had a whole reporting set up there with that, two of them, who watched things like this. But the report from them was that the man had just gone on the plane and they did not know who

The Lopez Report

HSCA Summary of Oswald and the CIA in Mexico City

Warrenton site The installation, under Army cover, is a CIA facility. It is the Archives for CIA holdings	p. 44
teltap coverage of 30 lines	p. 54 and others ok
identification of Soviet officials targetted	p. 56, 71 ok
identification of Cuban officials targetted	p. 58 ok
political action program	p. 177, 178

was in operation on only four of those days. This Committee has not been able to establish or disprove the possible inference that LILYRIC covered those days when there was no coverage from LIMITED because the production and logs from the LILYRIC base were not made available for review. That material was requested but has not been made available.141/ An explanation of why this material is missing was requested on 7/25/78.142/ The CIA's explanation stated that the photographs and logs "may have been destroyed in a purge of Mexico City Station files and that the folders for the destroyed material were reused to forward more recent photographic material to Headquarters for retention."143/ The folders which once contained the production were located at the National Archives' Warrenton Records Center but, according to the CIA's explanation, the folders contained production material from 1967.144/ Because the CIA has not provided the photographic production and logs from the LILYRIC for examination, no precise determination detailing the effectiveness of the coverage of the Soviet compound can be made.

surveillance project.189/ Even though Mr. Scott was the nominal case officer, the "routine case officer functions" were performed by Ms. Ann Goodpasture.190/ An American technician was stationed in the listening post to maintain the equipment and to protect the Station's interests there.191/ Ms. Goodpasture's duties in this operation ranged from meeting with the technician/officer inside the base for the purposes of daily supervision of the operation to handling the collection and distribution of the tapes and transcripts.192/ Ms. Goodpasture worked in this capacity until 1968.193/ With the exception of the technician, the listening post and the transcription room of this base [were staffed by Mexican Army officers] 194/ This listening post covered up to thirty lines at one time.195/ o/c

b. Analysis and Reporting of Information Obtained

[Mr. Herbert Manell] was responsible for the analysis, processing, and daily review of the Soviet transcripts.196/ The transcripts were reviewed on a daily basis by [Barbara Manell.] [Mrs. Manell] would

Release of the names of employees who retired under cover— postponed for release until May 1997

It should be noted, though, that an examination of the project files shows that Americans in contact with Communist diplomatic institutions were routinely reported to Headquarters for name traces and dissemination to the intelligence community.203/

3. Telephone Lines Covered

This Committee has made an attempt to determine which telephone lines at the Soviet and Cuban diplomatic compounds were subject to this electronic intercept operation in September and October of 1963. The monthly operational report of this project for the month of September lists the following phones as targets of the operation:204/

14-42-37	Cuban Embassy
14-92-14	Cuban Embassy
25-07-95	Cuban Embassy
14-13-26	Cuban Embassy
15-60-55	Soviet Embassy (Chancery)
15-61-55	Soviet Embassy (Chancery)
15-69-87	Soviet Embassy (Military Attache)
15-61-07	Soviet Embassy (Commercial Office)
15-12-64	Soviet Embassy (Film Representative)

ok

The report notes that lines 14-92-14 and 25-07-95 at the Cuban Embassy were disconnected on 23 September 1963.205/ The monthly report for October says that

in a chronological file.292/ One copy of the Cuban transcripts was routinely sent to Headquarters on a weekly basis.293/

(g) Format of Transcripts

The format of the transcripts that Mr. Tarasoff produced was much the same as those of the Spanish language transcripts described above.294/ Mr. Tarasoff's transcripts were from Russian into English.295/ Many of Mr. Tarasoff's transcriptions bear the notation "(previously transcribed)" after the meter number referring to the reel footage location of a conversation.297/ Mr. Tarasoff indicated that this notation meant that the conversation had already been transcribed from a tap on another embassy phone:

> "Previously transcribed" means, for instance, I went to the embassy first and the embassy number was 605055. Now this number 501264 belonged to the film's office. So consequently if that particular call went out of the main building to the films office and it had been transcribed before, that is exactly what I would do, put down "previously transcribed". So there was no question of doing it twice.298/

subject to the intercept operation. It should be noted, though, that there were five lines tapped in the Cuban compound in 1964.212/ They were:

14-42-37	The Ambassador's private telephone
25-07-95	The Chancery
14-13-26	The Chancery
25-09-14	The Commercial Office
11-28-47	The Consulate

One CIA employee who was involved in Cuban operations in Mexico City remembered that there were taps on the telephone of the Cuban Consulate.213/ It is possible that the employee, Mr. Phillips, who was stationed in Mexico City from 1961 to 1966, was incorrect, after a fifteen-year hiatus, in placing this tap in 1963.214/ As the above notes, an examination of the project files fails to support Mr. Phillips' memory, although those files do show that the Consulate telephone was tapped in 1964.

4. Production from Operation

The intercept listening post operated from approximately 7:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m. every day.215/

Q: Had the information concerning Oswald's visit to the Cuban Embassy in addition to the Soviet one, that Oswald had been requesting a visa, if it had been sent to CIA headquarters, would his case prior to the assassination have been handled in any different manner?

A: It would have been in the case of dissemination of information about him, but I do not think that any operational action would have taken to apprehend him or to contact him or to try to force him back to the United States.

Q: ...how would the dissemination have been treated differently?

A: Well, it simply means that we would have disseminated any additional information that we got. 657/

It cannot be determined with exactitude whether or not this additional information about Oswald was reported to Headquarters. In all likelihood it was not. The Chief of the Mexico Desk was asked whether or not the Station was ever criticized for this failure to report in the face of a specific request to do so by CIA Headquarters. He said:

> No. That was not because we were trying to go easy on them, it is simply because it is in the nature of the business. What you are trying to do is engage, as I used to say, in important illegal manipulations of society, secretly.
>
> We were running, at that time, a vast political action program in Mexico City to try to swing Mexico around from its Leftist direction to a middle of the road direction and it succeeded.

appeal

293

> I do not know whether you informed yourself about the magnitude of our political action program at the time--absolutely enormous.
>
> We were trying to follow the Soviets and all the satellites and the Cubans. At the same time, the main thrust of the Station's effort was to attempt to recruit Russians, Cubans and satellite people. 658/

Perhaps the nature of the CIA Mexico City Station's handling of the Oswald case prior to the assassination can best be summed up in Dave Phillips' response when he was asked how he would characterize that handling: "At the very best, it is not professional, at the best." 659/

V. Mexico City Station Reporting of Information Concerning Oswald After the Assassination

A. Reporting of information concerning the photograph of the Mexico Mystery Man

Even though some people in the Station clearly disassociated the photograph that was described in MEXI 6453 from Oswald after receiving the 10/11 cable, 656/ it is clear that some people still considered it possible for some reason that the photograph was of Oswald. In October, Ann Goodpasture had argued this very point with Winston Scott. 657/ On the day of the assassination, the Mexico City Station cabled Headquarters that it was sending as soon as possible "copies of only visitor to

Whitten

From the Desk of Linda C. Cipriani

NOTE FOR: John F. Pereira
J. Barry Harrelson
Eleanor E. Neiman @ DO
Fredrick C. Wickham @ DO
Johnny L. Goins @ DO
Fred Crawford @ DO

FROM: Linda C. Cipriani
DATE: 04/24/96 12:15:25 PM
SUBJECT: Interview with John W. (S)

CL By 2224130
CL Reason 1.5(c)
DECL On X1
DRV FM Hum 4-82

Attached is an MFR summarizing my meeting with Mr. Whitten. On a more personal note, Mr. Whitten is an extremely charming and interesting gentleman. The meeting with him went much better than I had hoped, but it was also rather emotionally distressing for both Jeremy and I. Mr. Whitten broke down several times during the meeting and was obviously feeling very scared. Although Jeremy is sure that the Board will do the right thing here, we both agreed that Mr. Whitten is without doubt someone who should be protected even if it means going to the President.

WHITTMFR.DOC

CC:

17 May 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with John Whitten (S)

1. On 22 April 1996, from approximately 1000 to 1600, Jeremy Gunn, General Counsel of the JFK Review Board, and I spoke with Mr. John Whitten at the U.S. embassy in Vienna. Gunn conducted the interview by showing Whitten various documents and his prior testimony before the HSCA. Mr. Whitten was eager to help the Board in any way he could and even offered to come to the US if need be. Gunn concluded that it would probably not be useful to take Whitten's deposition at a later date. Although Whitten had in general a good memory, Gunn felt he did not add anything of significance to his prior testimony before the HSCA. After the interview, Mr. Whitten took us to his apartment and then later to a restaurant with his wife. We left Mr. Whitten about 1900. (S)

2. Mr. Whitten was extremely worried and upset about the release of his name and on several occasions in the interview was on the verge of tears. Although I was expecting him to be angry with CIA and the Board, instead, he clearly felt hurt and betrayed. His obvious physical problems add to this feeling of being vulnerable. Physically he is not well; he is paralyzed on his left side and has great difficulty walking. On a map, he pointed out his apartment and indicated what he believed to be serious threats to his safety should his affiliation with CIA become known. Within a block of his apartment, he pointed out the headquarters of the PKK, the Anarchist party and a bar where many Middle Easterners would congregate. He then pointed out these places to us when we went to his apartment. He made it clear that there was no way he could defend himself from any attack. (S)

3. Mr. Whitten also stated that he has been retired for almost as long as he worked for the CIA, and that he has a completely different life now in Vienna. He and his wife have lived in Vienna approximately 25 years. He is a member of various musical and art societies. He sings in a prominent Vienna Men's Choir. He has published various articles on music (his specialty is Johann Strauss). He has received many medals for his work in the arts in Vienna which we saw when we went to his apartment. (S)

4. Mr. Whitten is also greatly worried about the fact that he committed perjury when applying for Austrian residency by stating he worked for the State Department. He believes this

CL BY: 2224130
CL REASON: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FM: HUM 4-82

SUBJECT: Interview with John Whitten (S)

could subject him to criminal penalties in Austria. He stated on several occasions, should his affiliation become known, he would have to leave Austria. On other occasions, he stated that he would turn himself in to the Viennese authorities and offer his services as a consultant to the police or intelligence service. He obviously was extremely distraught and was voicing what he believed were his options should his name be released by the Board, although he had not decided on a particular course of action. On the other hand, Mr. Whitten was adamant that no matter what happens he would never betray the CIA by telling anyone about his work as an intelligence officer. (S)

5. By the end of the evening, Mr. Whitten stated that he felt much better about the state of events. On several occasions, I had assured him that CIA was doing everything to protect him and Gunn had stated he would argue for his protection to the Board. He clearly looked upon Gunn and I as his allies in this process and even stated that he had a "wonderful" day talking to us. We left him, I believe, feeling happy and confident all would turn out well. (S)

6. After our meeting with Whitten, I spoke with Gunn about how this issue would be handled by the Board. Gunn believed that it was more than likely that the Board would agree to protect him and that he would make the strongest argument he could to them. The Board will make its decision in it's next meeting in mid-May. Gunn did not think it would be necessary for anyone from CIA to come down to that meeting. We agreed that should the Board make the reprehensible decision of releasing Whitten's name, that we could not imagine a stronger case on which to bring an appeal to the President. (S)

Linda C. Cipriani
DCI/OGC/LD

13-00000

SUBJECT: Interview with John Whitten (S)

DCI/OGC/LD/LCipriani:/76124 (17 May 96)

Distribution:
Original - Original
1 - Registry
1 - Lit File

24 April 1996

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2. Mr. Whitten was extremely worried and upset about the release of his name and on several occasions in the interview was on the verge of tears. Although I was expecting him to be angry with CIA and the Board, instead, he clearly felt hurt and betrayed. His obvious physical problems add to this feeling of being vulnerable. Physically he is not well; he is paralyzed on his left side and has great difficulty walking. On a map, he pointed out his apartment and indicated what he believed to be serious threats to his safety should his affiliation with CIA become known. Within a block of his apartment, he pointed out the headquarters of the PKK, the Anarchist party and a bar where many Middle Easterners would congregate. He then pointed out these places to us when we went to his apartment. He made it clear that there was no way he could defend himself from any attack. (S)

3. Mr. Whitten also stated that he has been retired for almost as long as he worked for the CIA, and that he has a completely different life now in Vienna. He and his wife have lived in Vienna approximately 25 years. He is a member of various musical and art societies. He sings in a prominent Vienna Men's Choir. He has published various articles on music (his specialty is Johann Strauss). He has received many medals for his work in the arts in Vienna which we saw when we went to his apartment. (S)

4. Mr. Whitten is also greatly worried about the fact that he committed perjury when applying for Austrian residency by stating he worked for the State Department. He believes this

CL BY: 2224130
CL REASON: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FM: HUM 4-82

SUBJECT: Interview with John Whitten (S)

could subject him to criminal penalties in Austria. He stated on several occasions, should his affiliation become known, he would have to leave Austria. On other occasions, he stated that he would turn himself in to the Viennese authorities and offer his services as a consultant to the police or intelligence service. He obviously was extremely distraught and was voicing what he believed were his options should his name be released by the Board, although he had not decided on a particular course of action. On the other hand, Mr. Whitten was adamant that no matter what happens he would never betray the CIA by telling anyone about his work as an intelligence officer. (S)

5. By the end of the evening, Mr. Whitten stated that he felt much better about the state of events. On several occasions, I had assured him that CIA was doing everything to protect him and Gunn had stated he would argue for his protection to the Board. He clearly looked upon Gunn and I as his allies in this process and even stated that he had a "wonderful" day talking to us. We left him, I believe, feeling happy and confident all would turn out well. (S)

6. After our meeting with Whitten, I spoke with Gunn about how this issue would be handled by the Board. Gunn believed that it was more than likely that the Board would agree to protect him and that he would make the strongest argument he could to them. The Board will make its decision in it's next meeting in mid-May. Gunn did not think it would be necessary for anyone from CIA to come down to that meeting. We agreed that should the Board make the reprehensible decision of releasing Whitten's name, that we could not imagine a stronger case on which to bring an appeal to the President. (S)

Linda C. Cipriani
DCI/OGC/LD

24 April 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with John Whitten (S)

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CL BY: 2224130
CL REASON: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X1
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Linda C. Cipriani
DCI/OGC/LD

SECRET

20 November 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR: Eleanor Neiman

FROM: Sue A. Burggraf

SUBJECT: Per our telecon, here is a copy of the cable that came in on Friday from Vienna.

REFERENCE:

Document displayed with Header, Body, and Footer zones

Edit cable **Categorize cable** **Print this cable**

CATEGORIES:

ROUTE SUBJECT: RESPONSE FOR JFK ASSASSINATION RECORDS COLLECTION ACT
ROUTE COMMENTS:

S E C R E T 171648Z NOV 95 STAFF

CITE VIENNA 28456

TO: DIRECTOR.

FOR: LIMIT CHIEF/OCC INFO OCC/OSG, CHIEF/PCS, C/EUR/SA, EUR/LGL, OGC/OSD, OGC/OFLD

SLUGS: WNINTEL

SUBJECT: RESPONSE FOR JFK ASSASSINATION RECORDS COLLECTION ACT

REF: A. DIRECTOR 493642 95 2040015
B. DIRECTOR 493658 95 2040060

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: NONE, FYI.

2. ON 14 NOVEMBER 1995, C/O NOBLEHORSE DELIVERED REF TEAR LINE INFORMATION AS REQUESTED. REF IDEN THEN ASKED FOR TIME TO FORMULATE HIS THOUGHTS AND SUBMIT THEM ON PAPER. ALTHOUGH NOBLEHORSE EXPLAINED THAT WE WOULD PREFER HE PASS THE RESPONSE DIRECTLY TO C/O, HE WAS APPARENTLY SO ANGERED OVER THE CONTENTS OF REF, THAT HE LATER TRIED TO CONTACT BERT MILLS DIRECTLY AND WITHOUT SUCCESS. ON 15 NOVEMBER, REF IDEN PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING RESPONSE IN WRITING, WHICH IS BEING POUCHED TO HQS VIA TM 902-825:

NOV 14, 1995

TO BERT MILLS:

SECRET

I OBJECT VIOLENTLY TO THE REVELATION OF MY NAME REGARDLESS OF THE LAW. HERE ARE SOME REASONS:

1. I EMIGRATED TO AUSTRIA TWICE, FIRST IN 1971 AND AGAIN IN 1983. BOTH TIMES I HAD TO FILL OUT AND SWEAR TO LENGTHY FORMS ABOUT MY BACKGROUND. I USED MY RETIRED STATE COVER BOTH TIMES, THEREBY COMMITTING PERJURY TWICE UNDER AUSTRIAN LAW. MY OLD FRIENDS IN HIGH PLACES WHO MIGHT HAVE BEEN ABLE TO PROTECT ME HAVE ALL RETIRED OR, EVEN MORE, DIED. AUSTRIAN JUSTICE IS NOTORIOUSLY IMMUTABLE. DO YOU WANT ME TO GO TO JAIL?

2. LIVING SINCE RETIREMENT IN AUSTRIA FROM 1971 TO 1980 AND FROM 1983 TO THE PRESENT, I HAVE ACHIEVED HIGH POSITIONS IN VIENNA'S MUSICAL BODIES, BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE JOHANN STRAUSS SOCIETY AND VICE PRESIDENT OF THE VIENNA MEN'S SINGING SOCIETY, AND I AM PERSONALLY KNOWN TO SEVERAL RECENT AUSTRIAN PRESIDENTS, MANY REPORTERS AND RADIO FIGURES. I SUFFERED A DISABLING STROKE IN DECEMBER 1993 AND MY WIFE AND I, BOTH 75, CAN CONTINUE TO EXIST HERE BECAUSE OUR 2000 SQ. FT. APARTMENT IS WITHIN WALKING DISTANCE OF 2 POST OFFICES, SEVERAL SMALL SUPER MARKETS, MY FAMILY PHYSICIAN, OUR DENTIST, MY UROLOGIST, AND AN EYE DOCTOR AND OPTICIAN. WE ARE WITHIN WHEEL CHAIR DISTANCE OF THE CONCERT HALLS AND THE OPERA. WHERE CAN YOU DUPLICATE THIS FOR ME?

3. DURING MY ACTIVE CAREER IN VIENNA AROUND 1959 I INTERROGATED AND BROKE AN INTELLIGENCE SWINDLER WHO HAD BEEN A NAZI ASSASSIN. I PROMISED HIM SECRECY IF HE CONFESSED, BUT THE US ARMY PUT OUT A "BURN NOTICE" ON HIM, FORCING HIM TO MOVE TO GERMANY. I AM SURE HE WOULD LOVE TO FIND ME AND SHOOT ME.

4. VIENNA IS FULL OF ISLAMIC TERRORISTS. THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL ASSASSINATIONS, EVEN OF A CITY COUNCILMAN, BY THEM IN RECENT YEARS. UNDER AUSTRIAN LAW, I, AS A FOREIGNER, CANNOT EVEN GET A PISTOL LICENSE. YOU MUST KNOW ABOUT THE KIDNAPPING AND KILLING OF OUR COLLEAGUES AROUND THE WORLD.

4. I HAVE TWICE TESTIFIED BEFORE HOUSE AND SENATE COMMITTEES ABOUT THE KENNEDY ASSASSINATION. THEIR FULL REPORTS SIMPLY CALLED ME THE "DESK OFFICER" AND THAT HAS SEEMED TO SATISFY EVERYONE. NEEDLESS TO SAY, IF YOU DO EXPOSE MY NAME, I WILL NOT EVER TALK TO ANY JOURNALISTS OR SO-CALLED HISTORIANS.

5. IF MY NAME IS EXPOSED, I WILL OBVIOUSLY HAVE TO LEAVE VIENNA, WITH THE WHOLE HOUSE FULL OF FURNITURE, PICTURES, LIBRARY, CLOTHING, ETC. WHICH I PACKED AND PAID TO HAVE MOVED OVER HERE IN 1983. BECAUSE OF MY STROKE, I WILL BE UNABLE TO DO ANY PACKING AND THE MOVE WILL BE VERY EXPENSIVE. WHERE CAN I RESETTLE IN A 2000 SQ FT. APT. SO CONVENIENTLY LOCATED.

6. MY WIFE AND I LOVE LIVING HERE FOR MANY REASONS, AND LEAVING WOULD BE A CRUEL AND NEEDLESS FATE.

7. I REGARD THIS LAW AS DISHONORABLE AND UNWORTHY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. IF YOU DECIDE AGAINST ME, I WANT TO APPEAR BEFORE THE BOARD AND EVEN THE PRESIDENT, WHOM I HAPPEN TO ADMIRE. I WILL PAY MY OWN WAY BACK TO DO SO. I SERVED IN WWII AND NEVER SPARED MYSELF; IN THE OUTFIT I WORKED HARD, WAS FEARLESS IN DEALING WITH MY SUPERIORS (CORD MEYER AND DICK HELMS CAN TESTIFY TO THAT) AND MY ADVERSARIES. I WOULDN'T EVEN THINK OF THREATENING TO EXPOSE THINGS TO PRESSURE YOU. I WILL BE EMPLOYING AN ATTORNEY OR TWO, FAMILIAR WITH OUR AFFAIRS, TO REPRESENT ME. I WILL NOT DENY, THAT I CONSIDER YOU AND EVERYONE ELSE IMPLEMENTING THIS LAW TO BE ENGAGING IN DISHONORABLE CONDUCT, UNWORTHY OF OUR GOVERNMENT SERVICE.

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8. IN THE LATE 1960'S WHILE SERVING IN VIENNA UNDER TOM KARAMISSINIS, I WAS ORDERED BY HQ TO REVEAL TO AUSTRIAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE THAT A LOW-RANKING AUSTRIAN DIPLOMAT SERVING AS THEIR INFORMANT IN BUDAPEST HAD ALSO BEEN RECRUITED BY US AND WAS REPORTI NG TO US. I REFUSED TO CARRY OUT THIS ORDER AND OFFERED MY RESIGNATION. TO ME, IT WAS DISHONORABLE TO BETRAY A YOUNG AGENT WHO HAD ACCEPTED OUR RECRUITMENT AND PUT FAITH IN OUR PROMISE OF SECRECY. TO MY MIND AN AGENCY WITHOUT PRINCIPLES CANNOT SURVIVE AND INDEED SHOULD NOT SURVIVE. TOM KARAMISSINIS, PERHAPS ONE OF THE LAST HONORABLE MEN TO SERVE WITH US IN HIGH POSITION, FIRED A STRONG CABLE BACK AND THE SHAMEFUL ORDER WAS RETRACTED.

9. I HAVE INVESTED ABOUT $50,000 IN MY APARTMENT, IN KEY MONEY AND IMPROVEMENTS. IF I LEAVE, I WILL LOSE ALL OR MOST OF THIS. OUR LAST MOVE TO VIENNA COST ME ABOUT $15,000 IN SEA FREIGHT AND INSURANCE. I WILL NEVER GET ON MY KNEES AND ASK TO BE MADE WHOLE IF YOU EXPOSE ME, BUT I MAY REPORT TO THE COURTS. I AM A RETIRED MEMBER OF THE VIRGINIA BAR.

10. LET ME REGALE YOU WITH AN EXAMPLE OF HOW THE HISTORIANS MINDLESS DRIVE TO KNOW EVERYTHING CAN LEAD TO A PROUD COUNTRY'S DISGRACING ITSELF. DURING WWII WHEN WE WERE INTERROGATING GERMAN POW'S, WE PROMISED THEM NO ONE WOULD EVER LEARN THEY HAD "SPILLED THEIR GUTS," AND WE ALL BELIEVED WE WERE BEING HONEST. BUT ALMOST 25 YEARS AFTER WWII THE BRITISH DECLASSIFIED ALL THE ADI(K) REPORTS (THAT'S WHAT THEY WERE CALLED, AND EVEN THE "ROOM CONVERSATIONS," TRANSCRIPTS OF THE CONVERSATIONS POWS HAD IN THEIR ROOMS, EVEN INCLUDING THE EXTREMELY VALUABLE SPEECHES MADE BY HIGH-RANKING LUFTWAFFE OFFICERS TO THEIR HIGH-RANKING FELLOW POW'S AT "COCKFOSTERS" MANSION. NEWCOMERS WERE VISITED BY THE OLD HANDS FOR A MONTH TO MAKE SURE THEY WEREN'T STOOL PIGEONS, BEFORE THEY WERE GIVEN THE PRIVILEGE OF ADDRESSING THEIR FELLOW OFFICERS ON SOME IMPORTANT ASPECT OF THE WAR. THE EXCELLENT BRITISH MIKES PICKED IT ALL UP.

IN RECENT YEARS, AT LEAST ONE LUFTWAFFE VETERAN ASSOCIATION, THAT OF J.G.2, THE RICHTHOFEN GESCHWADER, SENT PEOPLE TO LONDON TO GET COPIES OF THE INTERROGATION REPORTS OF THEIR PILOTS. THEY DID IT CHRONOLOGICALLY AND WERE SO SHOCKED AT THE VAST AMOUNT OF VITAL DATA REVEALED BY THEIR BUDDIES THAT, IN ACUTE REVULSION, THEY STOPPED LOOKING. I ASSUMED THEN THAT "EVERYONE" HAD "TALKED," WHICH IS TRUE.

11. I AM 75 YEARS OLD PARTLY PARALYZED ON MY LEFT SIDE FROM A STROKE IN DEC. 1993. I WAS NEARLY FULLY REHABILITATED WHEN, IN MAY 1994, I WAS HIT BY CONSTANT MUSCLE SPASMS ALL UP AND DOWN MY LEFT SIDE. THIS RATHER RARE CONDITION, BASICALLY A SUDDEN SUPER-HUMAN TIGHTENING OF ALL THE MUSCLES, WITH AFTER EFFECTS LASTING UNTIL THE NEXT SPASM, HAVE MADE IT INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT FOR ME TO STAND UP, WALK, OR EVEN SIT UP FOR VERY LONG. IN A FEW DAYS, WHEN ALL THE MANY MEDICINES ARE HERE, WILL BEGIN A 20-WEEK HOMEOPATHIC CURE FOR THE SPASMS UNDER DR. SCHRAMM, A LEADING SPECIALIST HERE. I CAN'T VERY WELL LEAVE FOR 20 WEEKS.

YOU WILL BE CONTACTED MOMENTARILY BY ONE OF MY ATTORNEYS. I WILL ALSO BE IN TOUCH WITH MY CONGRESSMAN AND SENATORS.

WITH BITTER RESOLVE,
(SIGNED - REF B IDEN)

3. REF IDEN HAD ALSO ATTEMPTED TO PUT THE ABOVE INTO "CABALESE," BUT BECAME TOO TIRED TO FINISH IT. NONETHELESS, REF IDEN ALSO REQUESTED THAT THE CONTENTS OF THIS MESSAGE ALSO BE PASSED:

SECRET

1. SAW SUBJ IN HIS APT NOV 14. CORDIAL

2. REASONS: SUBJ HAS EMIGRATED PRIVATELY TO AUSTRIA TWICE, 1971 AND 1983, USING RETIRED STATE COVER ON SWORN AUSTRIAN FORMS THUS COMMITTING PERJURY TWICE BY AUSTRIAN LAW. HIGH OFFICIAL HERE WHO COVERED FOR HIM NOW DEAD. WOULD FACE SCANDAL TRIAL, JAIL, AND DEPORTATION.

3. SUBJ PROMINENT IN LOCAL MUSIC CIRCLES, RADIO, TV, AND POLITICS AND MILITARY, GREAT SCANDAL POTENTIAL.

4. SUBJ INVESTED 50 THOUSAND DOLLARS IN APT AND WOULD LOSE IT IN HURRIED DEPARTURE, PLUS EXPENSE OF MOVING EFFECTS TO Z1, AND OWN FARES.

5. SUBJ NOW 75 HAD CRIPPLING STROKE DEC 93. WIFE ALSO 75 ABLE TO CARRY ON BECAUSE STORES, DENTIST, DOCTOR, UROLOGIST OF SUBJ, POST OFFICE ALL IN WALKING DISTANCE OF APT. CANNOT DUPLICATE THIS IN Z1.

6. SUBJ WOULD BE ENDANGERED BY ISLAMIC GROUPS HERE WHO HAVE ASSASSINATED SEVERAL INCL ONE CITY COUNCILMAN. EMBASSY GETS THREATENING PHONE CALLS. AS FOREIGNER SUBJ DENIED AUSTRIAN PISTOL PERMIT. SUBJ ALSO ENDANGERED BY FORMER NAZI ASSASSIN AND INTEL SWI NDLER HE INTERROGATED AND BROKE 25 YEARS AGO, PROMISING HIM SECRECY; BUT US ARMY PUT OUT BURN NOTICE, FORCING NAZI TO MOVE TO GERMANY.

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8. SUBJ AVERS HE WILL NEVER THREATEN TO EXPOSE AGENCY. EVEN IF SURFACED WILL DENY EVERYTHING.

4. FILE: 785-120-034.
CL BY: 618711
CL REASON: 1.5(C)

DECL ON: X1
DRV FROM: HUM 4-82.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

CC:

13-00000

EYES ONLY

CIA
INTERNAL USE ONLY

SECRET

CL BY: 618711
CL REASON: 1.5 C
DECL ON: X1
DRV FROM: HUM 4-82

Nov 14, 1995

To Bert Mills:

I object violently to the revelation of my name
regardless of the law. Here are some reasons:

1. I emigrated to Austria twice, first in 1971 and again
in 1983. Both times I had to fill out and swear to lengthy
forms about my background. I used my retired State cover
both times, thereby committing perjury twice under Austrian
law. My old friends in high places who might have been
able to protect me have all retired or, even more, died.
Austrian justice is notoriously immutable. Do you want me to
go to jail?

2. Living since retirement in Austria from 1971 to 1980
and from 1983 to the present, I have achieved high
positions in various musical bodies, Board of Directors
of the Johann Strauss Society and Vice President of
the Vienna Men's Singing Society, and I am personally
known to several recent Austrian Presidents, many
reporters and radio figures. I suffered a disabling stroke
in December 1993 and my wife and I, both 75, can
continue to exist here because our 2000 sq. ft. apartment
is within walking distance of 2 post offices, several small
super markets, my family physician, our dentist, my
urologist, and our eye doctor and optician. We are
within wheel chair distance of the concert halls and
the opera. Where can you duplicate this for me?

3. During my active career in Vienna around 1959
I interrogated and broke an intelligence swindler who
had been a Nazi assassin. I promised him secrecy if he
confessed, but the US Army put out a "burn notice"
him to move to many. I am sure

been several assassinations, even of a city councilman, by them in recent years. Under Austrian law, I, as a foreigner, can not even get a pistol license. You must know about the kidnapping and killing of our colleagues around the world.

4. I have twice testified before House and Senate committees about the Kennedy assassination. Their full report simply called me the "desk officer" and that has seemed to satisfy everyone. Needless to say, if you do expose my name, I will not even talk to any journalists or so-called historians.

5. If my name is exposed, I will obviously have to leave Vienna, with the whole house full of furniture, pictures, library, clothing, etc. which I packed and paid to have moved over here in 1983. Because of my stroke, I will be unable to do any packing and the move will be very expensive. Where can I resettle in an 2000 sq ft. apt. so conveniently located.

6. My wife and I love living here for many reasons and leaving would be a cruel and needless fate.

7. I regard this law as dishonorable and unworthy of the United States of America. If you decide against me, I want to appear before the Board and even the President, whom I happen to admire. I will pay my own way back to do so. I served in WWII and never spared myself; in the outfit I worked hard, was fearless in dealing with my superiors (Cord Meyer and Dick Helms can testify to that) and my adversaries. I wouldn't even think of threatening to expose things to pressure you. I will be employing an attorney or two, familiar with our affairs, to represent me. I will not deny, that I consider you and every-one else implementing this law to be [illegible] in dishonorable conduct, unworthy of

8. In the late 1960's while serving in Vienna under Tom Karamessines, I was ordered by HQ to reveal to Austrian Military Intelligence that a low-ranking Austrian diplomat serving as their informant in Budapest had also been recruited by us and was reporting to us. I refused to carry out this order and offered my resignation. To me, it was dishonorable to betray a young agent who had accepted our recruitment and put faith in our promise of secrecy. To my mind an agency without principles can not survive and indeed should not survive. Tom Karamessines, perhaps one of the last honorable men to serve with us in high position, fired a strong cable back and the shameful order was retracted.

9. I have invested about $50,000 in my apartment, in key money and improvements. If I leave, I will lose all or most of this. Our last move to Vienna cost me about $15,000 in sea freight and insurance. I will never get on my knees and ask to be made whole if you expose me, but I may resort to the courts. I am a retired member of the Virginia Bar.

10. Let me regale you with an example of how the historian's mindless drive to know everything can lead to a proud country's disgracing itself. During WWII when we were interrogating German POWs, we promised them no one would ever learn they had "spilled their guts" and we all believed we were being honest. But about 25 years after WWII the British
[illegible] the ADI(K) reports (that's what the

of the conversation POWs had in their rooms, even including the extremely valuable speeches made by high-ranking Luftwaffe officers to their high-ranking fellow POWs at "Cockfosters" mansion. Newcomers were vetted by the old hands for a month to make sure they weren't stool pigeons, before they were given the privilege of addressing their fellow officers on some important aspect of the war. The excellent British mikes picked it all up.

In recent years, at least one Luftwaffe veteran association, that of J.G. 2, the Richthofen Geschwader, sent people to London to get copies of the interrogation reports of their pilots. They did it chronologically and were so shocked at the vast amount of vital data revealed by their buddies that, in acute revulsion, they stopped looking. I assured them that "everyone" had "talked," which is true.

11. I am 75 years old, partly paralyzed on my left side from a stroke in Dec. 1993. I was nearly fully rehabilitated when, in May 1994, I was hit by constant muscle spasms all up and down my left side. This rather rare condition, basically a sudden super-human tightening of all the muscles, with after effects lasting until the next spasm, have made it increasingly difficult for me to stand up, walk, or even sit up for very long. In a few days, when all the many medicines are here, will begin a 20-week homeopathic cure for the spasms under Dr. Schramm, a leading

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SECRET

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

You will be contacted momentarily by one of my attorneys. I will also be in touch with my Congressman and Senator.

With bitter resolve,

John M. Whitten

13-00000

SECRET

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

1. SAW SUBJ IN HIS APT NOV 14. CORDIAL

X SUBJ HAS ~~PRE~~ WRITTEN PLEA TO REMAIN UNDER COVER.

2. REASONS: SUBJ HAS EMIGRATED PRIVATELY TO AUSTRIA TWICE, 1971 AND 1983, USING RETIRED STATE COVER ON SWORN AUSTRIAN FORMS THUS COMMITTING PERJURY TWICE BY AUSTRIAN LAW; HIGH OFFICIAL HERE WHO COVERED FOR HIM NOW DEAD. WOULD FACE SCANDAL TRIAL, JAIL, AND DEPORTATION.

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13-00000

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13-00000

Subj: On Scelso testimony
Date: Oct12 TueSun 19961995 18:46 EDT
From: 74030.3022@CompuServe.COM
X-From: 74030.3022@CompuServe.COM (ed dolan)
To: dickkovar@aol.com (Dick Kovar)

Dick, this is what Chuck Briggs requested.

Date: 06-Oct-96 02:36 EDT
From: [The name of this person is unimportant]
Subj: Ex-CIA Agent Adds Fuel to Kennedy Assassination Fire

Ex-CIA Agent Adds Fuel to Kennedy Assassination Fire
By Michael Dorman

The chief CIA investigator of President John F. Kennedy's assassination has testified that another high CIA official - noted for seeking conspiracies - disobeyed orders in repeatedly conferring with the Warren Commission shortly after the murder. The witness also said a colleague once told him that the CIA official, the late
James Angleton, ``has ties to the Mafia.''

Almost 33 years after the assassination, the identity of the witness, who held various top-secret CIA jobs, is considered so sensitive that federal authorities insist on withholding his true name. He is known only by the alias ``John Scelso.''

While Scelso testified before the House Select Committee on Assassinations in 1978, his 192-page testimony was kept secret until now. It has just been sent to the National Archives by the Assassination Records Review Board, a federal agency that screens assassination documents and makes public those that do not endanger national security.

Scelso's testimony, which criticized operations of the CIA, FBI, Secret Service and other agencies, likely will renew debates, especially among conspiracy theorists, on the assassination and how it was investigated.

When Kennedy was assassinated on Nov. 22, 1963, Scelso was chief of a CIA

branch
responsible for operations in Mexico and Central America. Richard Helms, the CIA chief of clandestine services and later the agency's director, placed Scelso in charge of the assassination investigation. Angleton, a counterintelligence official with close ties to FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, "immediately went into action to do all the investigating," Scelso testified, criticizing the move sharply.

"Helms called a meeting at which Angleton and a lot of others were present and told everybody that I was in charge and that no one should have any conversations with anyone about the Kennedy case without my being present - which was violated from the word 'go' by Angleton, who dealt with the FBI and the Warren Commission and (Warren Commission member and former CIA Director Allen) Dulles himself. ... Angleton ignored Helms' orders. I tried to get Helms to make him obey and Helms said, 'You go tell him.' "

Angleton, who died in 1987, spent much of his career searching for conspiracies - believing that there was a Communist mole in the CIA - and was presumed by other CIA officers to have tried to press a conspiracy theory on the Warren Commission. The commission found no evidence of a conspiracy. Angleton was fired
in 1975. Years later, a mole was found - Aldrich Ames - but he had entered the CIA after Angleton's dismissal.

At one point in the 1978 House testimony, committee attorney Michael Goldsmith asked, "Do you have any reason to believe that Angleton might have had ties to organized crime?"

"Yes," replied Scelso, who is now retired and lives abroad, government sources said. He said the Justice Department once asked the CIA to determine the true names of people holding numbered bank accounts in Panama because the Mafia was hiding Las Vegas "skim" money there. "We were in an excellent position to do this and told them so - whereupon Angleton vetoed it and said, 'That is the bureau's (FBI's) business.' " Scelso said he discussed the situation with another CIA officer. "And he smiled a foxy smile and said, 'Well, that's Angleton's excuse. The real reason is that Angleton himself has ties to the Mafia and he would not
want to double-cross them.' "

On another subject, Scelso gave Kennedy conspiracy theorists a slight piece of

ammunition. A Soviet defector, Yuri Nosenko, was known to have told investigators that Lee Harvey Oswald - identified by the Warren Commission as Kennedy's assassin - was not a Soviet agent. But Scelso said: "I later heard that Nosenko was discovered to have been dissembling, not being on the level. That information was imparted to me by CIA officers."

Based on the information CIA headquarters had on Oswald before the assassination - chiefly that he had been in the Marine Corps and defected to the Soviet Union, then returned - Scelso said he saw no reason to pay him special heed. "Oswald just seemed to me to be a small-potatoes defector," he said. But he conceded that significant information about Oswald - known to CIA agents in Mexico City, for example - had not reached headquarters before the assassination.

It dealt chiefly with Oswald's visits to the Soviet and Cuban embassies in Mexico City and his attempts to obtain a Cuban visa two months before the assassination. Scelso said the information failed to reach Washington because of simple overwork and bureaucratic delays in the Mexico City office. He revealed that all the outside telephone lines at the Soviet and Cuban embassies were tapped by American agents and that calls Oswald made to them were recorded. After Oswald was arrested, Scelso revealed, agents compared audiotapes made while he was in custody with the wiretaps and determined that he was the same man who had visited the embassies.

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